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Abstract: (1) Background: Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRG), one possibility of a hospital payment
system, are currently used in most European countries. Introduced to the Czech system in the 1990s,
the DRGs are currently used mainly for care reporting and partly for reimbursement. According to
most experts, the use of DRG remain controversial. The goal of this paper was to study the effects of
the current Czech DRG system on hospitals financing and, on this basis, to propose possible changes
to the reimbursement mechanism in the Czech Republic. (2) Methods: Qualitative research methods
were used for evaluating DRG mechanisms of application in three selected healthcare establishments
in the CR in the period of 2012–2018. (3) Results: Our study shows that the current implementation of
the DRG system is set up in a way that is very similar to traditional flat rates and is unlikely to yield
major positive effects of the DRG mechanism, such as predictability of payments for hospitalisation
cases, care quality and efficiency and transparent financing. (4) Conclusions: Based on our results,
deep systemic change of the reimbursement mechanism in the Czech Republic is necessary. We
propose five partial measures leading to the cultivation of the Czech DRG.
Keywords: DRG; Czech Republic; hospital economy
1. Introduction
Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRG) represent one possibility of a hospital payment
system (see [1]). Their mechanism is based on the principle that all patients treated by a
hospital are classified into a limited number of DRGs, which are supposed to be clinically
meaningful and relatively homogenous in their resource consumption patterns [2–4]. Each
DRG is associated with a specific cost weight or tariff, which is usually calculated from
information about average treatment costs of patients falling within a specific DRG in a
sample from other hospitals in the past.
DRG-based payments are currently used in most European countries, especially in
acute hospital care (France, Germany, Austria, England, Sweden, Poland, Ireland, Estonia,
Portugal, Spain, etc.). DRG systems are internationally used for three reasons: first, they
should increase the transparency of services which are effectively provided in hospitals
(that is, through patient classification, measuring hospital output, etc.); second, DRG-based
payment systems should give incentives for the efficient use of resources within hospitals
by paying hospitals on the basis of the number and type of cases treated; and finally,
the combination of increased transparency and efficient use of resources is assumed to
contribute to improving, or at least assuring, the level of quality of care [4]. On the other
hand, DRGs may be connected to several bottlenecks, e.g., a lack of transparency, which
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tends to promote classification abuse and creates compromises between the quality of
treatment and financial considerations [5,6].
The use of DRGs has long been one of the most controversial issues in the Czech
healthcare community. Introduced to the Czech system in the 1990s after several attempts
to increase its use, the DRG mechanism is currently used mainly for care reporting and
partly for reimbursement. However, according to most experts, the working Czech system
has created an environment where different healthcare providers are paid differently for
the same services regardless of the quality of care, mostly due to historical peculiarities
that have been preserved in the system, see for example [7]. Moreover, the Czech DRG
system does not seem to motivate providers to higher efficiency. To improve the situation,
a DRG Restart Project is currently underway in the Czech Republic aimed at improving
the hospital care reimbursement mechanism; the first outcomes are expected to roll out in
2021, with the aim of reflecting the need to deliver evidence-based changes into the Czech
hospital reimbursement system.
The goal of this paper is to study the effects of the current Czech DRG system on
hospital financing and, on this basis, to propose possible changes to the reimbursement
mechanism in the Czech Republic.
The paper is divided into three core parts. First, we provide the DRG literature review
and present a background in financing of the Czech health service providers. Second, a case
study is provided to illustrate how DRG works in the Czech Republic. Finally, in the light of
our results, we discuss the situation and propose changes to the reimbursement mechanism
in the Czech Republic in relation to changes proposed within the DRG Restart project.
2. DRG-Based Reimbursement on Hospital Level
In this section, the secondary literature review about DRG delivers an overview of the
pros and cons of DRGs and their potentially expected effects on the behaviour of hospitals.
Traditionally, there have been several main forms of reimbursement methods used
for financing the health service providers, see for example [8,9]. At the hospital level,
most countries use retrospective forms, e.g., the fee-for-service reimbursement in which
providers receive payment for each service rendered, or the episode-of-care reimbursement
where providers receive a lump-sum for all the services they provide related to a condition
or disease—such as DRG payments, for example.
The cultivation of DRG reimbursement payments might be seen as one of the priorities
of many European reimbursement systems. Some countries created their own reimburse-
ment system (e.g., England, The Netherlands) while others only transformed their already
established systems (e.g., France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Sweden). All systems
have gone through frequent changes and case classification is widely different in different
countries [10].
2.1. ‘Technical’ Problems of DRGs
The implementation of a DRG is connected with many problems and obstacles (a sum-
mary of the main issues is provided in Table 1).
There is a set of common issues connected to the effort to create a consistent definition
of groups. First, the adequate number of groups needs to be tackled. It is possible to
observe a rise in the number of groups, as in the German G-DRG where the number
of groups sharply increased in 2005–2011 [5,10,11], as well as the tendence to decrease
the number of groups (France, The Netherlands). The French experience shows that too
many groups might be superfluous [12], and a similar trend was seen in the Netherlands
(30,000 groups in 2010) when their number was reduced to 4400 in 2012 [10,13]. The second
issue is connected to the number of classification levels. It seems that classification based
on a cumulative score of secondary diagnoses provides a more accurate definition of case
severity, taking into account patient polymorbidity [4,10,11,14]. This secondary diagnosis
coding system increases the predictability of the reimbursement mechanism.
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The intentional declaration of cases as more serious than they actually were might be
seen as another shared point. The tendency to increase the seriousness of cases is a result
of a poorly designed system that fails to take into account the severity of specific cases
and does not allow hospitals to report the real cost. A solution may lie in a higher number
of classification factors, which, however, would make the system more complicated and
less straightforward for provider performance benchmarking. This approach has been
taken by Sweden. In general, prioritising less severe cases or inequalities in their treatment
depend on the level of competition among healthcare providers and is more prevalent
among private healthcare providers (as can be seen in England and France). Some countries
use age to clarify their classification, and age may even be applied differently in different
areas of medical care. According to studies by Mason et al. and Geissler et al., half
of 10 studied EU countries have DRG systems that use patient age as a factor in case
classification for appendectomies but only two countries use age as a factor in unplanned
hip replacements [15,16]. Once again, careful thought must be given to which cases warrant
the use of patient age as a serious element for group classification. Patient age may also
be taken into account in situations where the cumulative score of secondary diagnoses
is used.
There is also a common tendency to incorporate quality indicators into the reimburse-
ment system, and England may be seen as exceptional in this effort [10,13]. Of all the
European systems, the English one gives the highest weight to quality and demonstrates
how important it is to set clear rules and procedures for quality evaluation, although they
do not necessarily lead to improvements in all areas of care [17]. Evaluation of care quality
is closely linked to complication reporting. Some EU countries recognise not only the main
and secondary diagnoses but also co-morbidities known at the time when a patient is
admitted to hospital and complications that arise during hospitalisation, using markers to
report these.
Base rate convergence is another common issue. Inspiration can be found in Germany,
although the relative success and efficiency of two phases of base rate convergence in
this system are debatable. The objective is to unify rates at the national level through a
regulation corridor, but different base rates are defined for different federal states. A system
of reference base rates and acceptable deviations (as a percentage) seems to be a logical
approach to base rate convergence. The correct setting of the corridor is crucial because
even in Germany, according to Klein-Hitpaß et al., many base rates were near the bottom
of the agreed bracket [18].
Repeated hospitalisation and the length of stay are examples of classic DRG commonly
solved problematic issues. Some countries, such as England and Germany, try to prevent
repeat hospitalisations by not paying for the subsequent hospitalisation if it occurs within
a certain period of time after the patient is released from the first hospitalisation. The effect
of the length of hospitalisation on reimbursement per treatment day has been studied
by Baron et al. in the French DRG, where the average reimbursement per treatment day
depends on the total length of hospitalisation and defined standards [19]. Providers get
paid more for shorter hospitalisations, however, above a certain number of treatment days
the case must be coded under a greater severity level. The system also includes motivation
for one-day hospitalisation in an orthopaedic ward with payments for a case without
complications including overnight stay in the hospital being identical to payments for an
out-patient procedure.
Ensuring professional coding represents another common issue. Setting correct coding
details without putting too much burden on providers is of crucial importance. The impact
of reporting quality on the amount of reimbursements was studied by Mieth et al. and
it was discovered that higher revenues could be achieved in the Australian DRG system
in up to 34% of cases through secondary diagnosis coding, but maximum profit was not
correlated with the maximum number of diagnoses [20]. The accuracy of coding is also
connected with the hospital staff’s professional approach as well as with the appropriate
role of payers within the reimbursement system who, as mentioned by Jackson et al., should
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not be interested only in financial audits [11]. Simply creating an adequate classification,
however, will not ensure correct coding of patients’ clinical states in DRG; assuring a longer
term, pre- and post-graduate education for coders is essential.
Another common issue is connected with the decision about the type of cost
management—obligatory (e.g., England or the Netherlands), voluntary or just recom-
mended (Sweden). Managers of healthcare facilities cannot make decisions without
having the reliable cost information. In order to measure the financial performance
more accurately, the so-called Activity-Based Costing (ABC) method may be used. In
the ABC calculation, hospital procedures are assigned to events that generate costs.
Finally, there is the question of the level of centralisation. Even if, in most systems,
the state plays the role of guarantor of care quality, the French experience shows that
healthcare providers may have greater autonomy, and reimbursement might be managed
at the national level to a lesser degree [12].
Table 1. Identification of problems and potential solutions (Authors).
Issue Potential Solutions Who Wrote about It
1.
Consistent definition of groups creation
- Adequate number of groups (see French, German,
or Dutch examples in the text)
- The number of classification levels (classification
based on a cumulative score of secondary




Tendency to increase the seriousness of cases
- Higher number of classification factors (e.g., using





- Higher weight to quality indicators in the









Repeated hospitalisation and length of stay
- Not paying for the subsequent hospitalisation if it
occurs within a certain period of time after the
patient is discharged;
- Paying more for shorter hospitalisations, however,
above a certain number of treatment days the case
must be coded under a greater severity level
[19]
6.
Professional coding - Creation of a coder manual [20]
7.
Cost billing system
- Method of costing based on ABC calculation.
Similar to the bottom-up micro-costing allocation
method, this method assesses medical services
based on detailed cost components of individual
cases, taking into account centres of highly
specialised care (higher cost due to depreciation of




- To give healthcare providers greater autonomy




Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 5463 5 of 18
2.2. DRGs and Motivation of Hospitals
DRGs can be perceived as some kind of compromise between the fee-for-service and
lump-sum payments [21]. As such, the system is expected to have an important impact
on the behaviour of hospitals and their efficiency parameters. Based on the literature, the
three main issues connected with the DRG-based payment systems’ influence on hospital
behaviour are: (1) motivation to increase hospitals efficiency, (2) hospital benchmarking
(comparison among and/or within hospitals, comparison with reference hospitals, etc.)
and (3) source of information for hospital managers (monitoring concrete activities which
may help managers to identify problems and their potential solutions) [4,21,22].
Among these issues, the motivation to achieve efficient behaviour might be seen as the
most controversial issue (see more in [22]). In theory, a DRG should motivate the hospital
to be more effective, i.e., to use its resources optimally, to maximise revenues and to reduce
costs. However, based on Quentin et al., the effects of DRG on efficiency have been highly
controversial (reducing cost without the quality improvements) [22].
There are three main incentives for hospitals resulting from DRG-based hospital
payment systems that have (both intended and unintended) consequences on efficiency,
quality and technological innovation: to reduce costs per treated patient, to increase
revenues per patient and to increase the number of patients [22]. All hospitals, including
the most efficient ones, are incentivised to continually reduce costs (e.g., by reducing
the length of stay; by avoiding duplicity of and unnecessary tests; by replacing costly
treatments by similarly effective but less costly alternatives, etc.). However, unfortunately,
if the incentives for cost reduction are too strong and if regulatory authorities do not have
sufficient capacity to adequately monitor the quality of care, DRG-based hospital payment
can lead to cost reductions without any improvements in efficiency, e.g., inappropriately
discharging patients or service intensity reduction to a level at which necessary services
are withheld from patients [22].
According to Simon, DRGs may be seen as a tool enabling the hospital to identify
ineffective activities and procedures, with the aim of achieving the most satisfactory results
while providing the minimum possible level of care [21].
Hospitals are likely to be over- or underpaid for specific DRGs if cost data are inac-
curate [16]. Although profitable DRGs may, in practice, compensate for less profitable
DRGs, hospitals are disincentivised to improve efficiency for certain groups of patients if
cost accounting leads to overestimated payments for a specific DRG. On the other hand,
hospitals are disincentivised to provide unprofitable high-quality care if cost accounting
leads to underestimated payments for a specific DRG [16].
3. Background: Financing Health Service Providers in the Czech Republic
The Czech healthcare services, as well as doctors’ skills, generally rank well in in-
ternational tables [23]. The Czech Republic has a system of statutory health insurance
based on compulsory membership in one of the health insurance funds. The insurers
are quasi-public, self-governing bodies that act as payers and purchasers of care. Czech
residents may freely choose their health insurer as well as healthcare providers [24].
Health indicators, such as infant and maternal mortality and life expectancy, have
continuously improved in the past two decades. Like any country, the healthcare system
faces the challenges of rapidly expanding possibilities of medical treatment and research
with restricted public resources (see e.g., [23,24] to obtain more information about the
Czech Health system). Balancing between maintaining open access to healthcare and the
need to improve efficiency has kept the country in constant debate about the future of its
healthcare [23].
Several reimbursement methods in financing health service providers are used in
the Czech Republic: fee-for-service, lump-sum payment, per-day payment and DRG
payments. Services are reimbursed to healthcare providers retrospectively. The conditions
of healthcare reimbursement are defined by law. In-patient care in the Czech Republic is
divided into three groups: (i) intensive care, (ii) other hospital services such as aftercare
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treatment, rehabilitation etc., and (iii) day cases [8]. The in-patient care reimbursement is
calculated using a complicated equation in which the DRG payments are partly used for
the intensive care only (44% of intensive care in 2021 but only 7% in 2020).
Reimbursement for in-patient care on the basis of DRGs started to be taken seriously
as early as the 1990s in the context of the transformation of the Czech healthcare system,
despite heavy criticism from some experts [25]. A real DRG pre-development project in the
Czech Republic was initiated in 2007 and hospital care was supposed to be partly financed
based on a DRG as of the following year. However, this start was delayed one year to 2009.
The introduction of a DRG in 2007–2009 was mired by many problems. Numerous
changes were put in place over time (e.g., code additions/changes, ‘economic outliers’
introduction, rate adjustments). However, problems persisted. According to Roegnerová,
the hospital sample was too small and the relative weights were calculated based on just
four hospitals out of 150 [26]. There were also issues with system homogeneity—both
in time and place (in terms of hospitals involved in the pilot)—and, last but not least,
healthcare providers’ perceived lack of predictive capabilities.
All this led to two decisions made in 2014. First, the decision to stop financing hospital
care based on a DRG and to temporarily return to flat fees in 2015. Second, the decision to
transfer the DRG agenda to the Institute of Health Information and Statistics of the Czech
Republic (ÚZIS), an organisational unit of the Ministry of Health, despite the fact that
ÚZIS is not authorised to make any changes that could affect reimbursement, i.e., it cannot
impose specific reimbursement mechanisms. In 2015, ÚZIS set up a network of hospitals
(covering four of five hospital categories recognised in the Czech Republic) that provide
reference data used in the development of new methodological documents.
As a result, the only changes related to the original DRG system implemented in
the Czech Republic since 2015 were those necessary for the continuous functioning of the
system (for example, the grouper and definition manual have not been updated at all since
2015 [27]). To restart the DRG on the new and better basis, the DRG Restart programme
was then launched in 2016 with the objective of ‘building a long-term, sustainable data,
information and personnel base for the optimisation and continuous development of the
hospital care payment system in the Czech Republic and increasing the predictive power
and efficiency of payment mechanisms for this segment of healthcare’ [28]. According to
Malý, this project, in its first stage, can serve as a good example of intelligent, evidence-
based policymaking, as it has been designed in a ‘scientific’ way and is run and managed
by persons with a strong and respectable record as scientists and experts in this specific
field [1].
Collection of calibration data started in the same year and continued until 2018. Data
were also sourced from health insurers and the National Register of Hospitalised Patients.
In spring 2018, the approved CZ-DRG implementation concept was approved, including
a schedule and methodological materials. The DRG Restart is expected to end in 2023
when the original DRG system is supposed to shut down and be fully replaced by CZ-DRG
through specific legislative changes [29].
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the reimbursement mechanism currently
used in the Czech Republic is considered unsustainable by top authors on the topic [30,31].
We summarise their core opinions below:
1. The biggest problem of the current DRG is the poor definition of groups, which is
not uniform in clinical or economic terms. This means that the real cost does not
correspond to the current diagnosis classification and cost is not predictable with
sufficient accuracy. This lack of clarity probably stems from the unfortunate choice
of the NRC reference networks and incomplete definition of cost involved in patient
hospitalisation, as well as an absence of cost deviation analyses.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 5463 7 of 18
2. The inaccurate classification system resulted in incorrect reporting of performance
delivered or contracting care from departments other than those where the patient
was treated (e.g., reporting operating theatre treatment as treatment performed at
hospital beds). This resulted in inequalities between reported treatment and the real
cost and resources consumed. There are even cases where a diagnosis is impossible to
code and properly report to insurers.
3. A frequently discussed topic is the discrepancy in base rates, which is due to ‘individ-
ual base rates’ (IZS). Rates can differ for different healthcare providers but the decree
also allows different insurers to negotiate different rates. Base rates can be unified
only in a situation where the system has a predictive capability of adequate quality.
4. Another problem stems from the diagnosis coding procedure used in different hospi-
tals. It is not uncommon for doctors to do the coding themselves based on medical
documentation. The coding might then be checked by a coder but it is impossible to
check all coded cases due to time constraints. Coders are currently trained primarily
through courses. It is, therefore, debatable whether doctors should be responsible for
coding, especially at a time when hospitals are struggling with a lack of doctors.
4. Materials and Methods
The goal of this paper is to study the effects of the current Czech DRG system on
hospitals’ financing and, on this basis, to propose possible changes to the reimbursement
mechanism in the Czech Republic. The core research question(s) is if the current DRG
might be seen as fair and motivating.
In terms of methodology, we utilised as our main method the qualitative research
method to achieve planned results. Certain quantitative research elements, appropriate for
this study, are also included.
To illustrate how the reimbursement mechanism works in the Czech Republic, the
authors evaluated the mechanism’s application in three selected regional healthcare estab-
lishments in the period of 2012–2018. The healthcare establishments were selected in the
way that (1) they have the same legal form (allowance organisations of regions) and (2) they
belong to the same four Czech DRG categories (this is the ‘regional hospitals providing
comprehensive types of healthcare’ category which comprises 76 hospitals). All these
hospitals were asked to participate in this study. Unfortunately, only three hospitals agreed
to cooperate. The small size of the sample is one of the limits of this analysis.
The surgery and orthopaedic wards were chosen for our study, as these wards were
comparable in terms of size, structure and extent of care provided. All three hospitals
used a unified management IT system. Seven DRG bases that represent typical activities
performed in the given wards were selected for the purpose of our case study:
1. appendix operations (0605),
2. laparotomy of groin, thigh, umbilical or epigastric hernia (0608),
3. laparoscopy of groin, thigh, umbilical or epigastric hernia (0606),
4. laparoscopic cholecystectomy (0704),
5. cholecystectomy, other than laparoscopic (0703),
6. total knee replacement—TEP (0818),
7. arthroscopy (0819).
The authors delivered their own quantitative cost and revenue analysis for the selected
DRG bases, or rather an analysis of the revenues generated by each DRG base. The cost
analysis included the cost of the specific wards as well as the cost of central operating
theatres, in addition to the primary ward cost and the cost of auxiliary and infrastructure
activities. The authors used the ABC method to calculate the costs (using primary data
collected in hospitals), where the costs were assigned to five defined activities: admission
(A1), anaesthesiology (A2), surgery (A3), hospitalisation (A4) and discharge (A5).
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Cost coding was based on qualified estimates and specific equations, taking into
account the intensity of labour necessary to carry out each activity. In this respect, a ‘people
activity matrix’ had to be created in order to express the amount of time needed by staff
to carry out each activity. In light of the information obtained, it was very complicated to
set the average time that the staff need to devote to a patient during the hospitalisation
stay, as this data were influenced by the bed occupancy and the severity of the given case.
This is why, in the case of hospitalisation, only the personnel costs of the physicians and
physiotherapists were allocated directly. The example for the total knee replacement base
is shown in Table A1 (see Appendix A).
Cost identification and their assignment to each individual diagnosis were complicated
by the fact that costs were allocated differently in the studied hospitals, and in some cases
the impossibility of finding all the necessary information which did occur. The example of
the cost matrix for the total knee replacement base (0818) in hospital B is shown in Table A2
(see Appendix A). Due to cost allocation in this hospital, the ‘surgery’ activity was divided
into two partial activities: activity A 3.1 represents the cost of central operating theatres and
activity A 3.2 represents the personnel and material costs assigned to the relevant ward.
To calculate the cost per activity unit, we had to set relational values for each activity
(admission—number of patients; anaesthesiology—number of patients; surgery—length of
surgery and number of patients; hospitalisation—number of days in care; and discharge—
number of patients). In light of the data obtained, the cost object was defined as the average
patient of the specific DRG base in the studied wards. As an example, Table A3 shows the
situation in base 0818 (see Appendix A).
In the revenue analysis, we calculated the revenues per average patient in the base
in the studied wards. The revenue was not calculated directly but was provided by the
healthcare providers from the unified management IT system.
To obtain a direct opinion of the core stakeholders, we also conducted semi-structured
interviews with the DRG experts in order to evaluate the reimbursement mechanism’s use
in 2012–2018.
5. Results
How DRG Actually Works in the Czech Republic (Case Study of Three Co-Operating Hospitals)
As described in the methodology, we performed a cost and revenue analysis for
selected DRG bases in three co-operating regional hospitals. In this section, the results of
the analysis are presented.
The comparison of the average cost and revenues per patient in the three hospitals for
the selected bases can be seen in Tables 2–7. The Case Mix Index (CMI)—a relative value
assigned to measure the average severity level of hospital procedures—is shown in the
third column of the table. The CMI specifies the financial intensity of cases in each base
and representation of DRG groups. Tables 2–7 indicate that there is no direct link between
CMIs and payments to hospitals.
Table 2. Comparison of the average cost and revenues per patient, Hospital A.
DRG Base Costs (CZK) Revenues (CZK) Difference (CZK) CMI
0605 31,125 33,647 2522 1.042
0606 41,556 36,863 −4693 1.141
0608 21,930 22,276 346 0.690
0703 63,126 62,413 −713 1.933
0704 41,928 39,853 −2075 1.234
0818 85,597 108,604 23,007 3.491
0819 9011 19,620 10,609 0.608
CMI: The Case Mix Index.
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Table 3. Comparison of the average cost and revenues per patient, Hospital B.
DRG Base Costs (CZK) Revenues (CZK) Difference (CZK) CMI
0605 30,044 29,728 −316 1.000
0606 29,966 34,369 4403 1.156
0608 22,262 22,212 −50 0.747
0703 70,199 69,126 −1073 2.324
0704 35,722 38,399 2677 1.291
0818 126,541 104,568 −21,973 3.516
0819 12,328 18,167 5839 0.611
Table 4. Comparison of the average cost and revenues per patient, Hospital C.
DRG Base Costs (CZK) Revenues (CZK) Difference (CZK) CMI
0605 36,083 29,678 −6405 1.057
0606 35,673 32,557 −3116 1.138
0608 20,774 20,442 −332 0.703
0703 66,537 57,639 −8898 1.961
0704 35,907 35,859 −48 1.234
0818 142,750 101,381 −41,369 3.493
0819 13,809 17,525 3716 0.604
Table 5. Comparison of hospitals: difference between costs for defined DRG bases.
DRG Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Remark
0605 31,125 30,044 36,083 Homogeneous
0606 41,556 29,966 35,673 Too big a difference
0608 21,930 22,262 20,774 Homogeneous
0703 63,126 70,199 66,537 Almost homogeneous
0704 41,928 35,722 35,907 Almost homogeneous
0818 85,597 126,541 142,750 Too big a difference
0819 9011 12,328 13,809 Too big a difference
Table 6. Comparison of hospitals: difference between revenues for defined DRG bases.
DRG Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Remark
0605 33,647 29,728 29,678 Differences not explainable by CMI
0606 36,863 34,369 32,557 Differences not explainable by CMI
0608 22,276 22,212 20,442 Differences not explainable by CMI
0703 62,413 69,126 57,639 Differences not explainable by CMI
0704 39,853 38,399 35,859 Differences not explainable by CMI
0818 108,604 104,568 101,381 Differences not explainable by CMI
0819 19,620 18,167 17,525 Differences not explainable by CMI
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Table 7. Comparison of hospitals: difference between costs and revenues for defined DRG bases.
DRG Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Remark
0605 2522 −316 −6405 Too big a difference
0606 −4693 4403 −3116 Too big a difference
0608 346 −50 −332 Too big a difference
0703 −713 −1073 −8898 Too big a difference
0704 −2075 2677 −48 Too big a difference
0818 23,007 −21,973 −41,369 Too big a difference
0819 10,609 5839 3716 Too big a difference
The summarised results (Tables 2–7) show that there are DRG bases with a high
degree of homogeneity among providers in terms of cost, an example is base 0608. At the
same time, there are DRG bases with a marked differentiation such as 0818; this result
might be seen as surprising as the total knee replacement base is usually known to be
homogenous—this may be caused by the small size of the hospital sample.
The fact that the differences in costs are extremely high cannot be simply explained by
the providers’ different levels of efficiency because the current system lacks clear standards
that would define the required content of hospitalisation cases of intensive hospital care.
The cost differences also stem from contracts on healthcare services and from the structure
of each case in each ward. Higher personnel costs also play a role (higher percentage of
physicians) as does a higher volume of requested care and higher cost of depreciation
of modern medical technology. The differences in cost might also be influenced by the
hospital cases in the given ward, the share of intensive and planned care, operating theatres
working time, etc. [27].
Regarding revenues, the tables show that hospitals do not seem to receive similar
reimbursement for the same diagnosis. The difference may have two sources, i.e., different
case mix and different approaches of health insurance companies.
It is interesting to observe the relationship between the average patient CMI and
revenues from different insurers. As an example, the following three charts (Figures 1–3)
show the situation in case 0606 (laparoscopy of groin, thigh, umbilical or epigastric hernia).
The charts illustrate the relationship between the revenue and CMI, and at the same time
the different frequency of individual insurers is shown. The individual insurers are colour-
coded and if the same amount of average revenue and CMI for more insurers appears,
brown is used.
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is comparison clearly shows rate differences in th given year not only amongst
hospitals but also within hospitals. Different revenues from different payers indicate that
although reimbursement depends on the CMI level, individual rates play a role as well.
Our results indicate two (probably interrelated) problems, i.e., limited impact of the use
of DRG reimbursement on the hospital funding and the limited fairness of the existing
reimbursement system. Being aware of t small size of sample, both issues were discussed
with expert opinions who confirm d their validity.
The ex-mi ister of health and the ex-director of VFN hospital, Dana Jurásková, claimed
that ‘unfortunately, the Czech reimbursement mechanism is still too sophisticated and
unpredictable. In this situation, it is very difficult for the management staff to plan the
mix of care to provide in such a way that it would be sustainable or even beneficial for the
hospital. In addition, the possibility to behave in this manner is strongly limited for the
public hospitals in the Czech Republic. Mor over, the total costs per patient which is used
in this analysis are usually not monitored in the Czech hospitals—changing this practice
will be expensive and de anding. However, only when the management staff really knows
all the costs of their hospital, can they adopt their strategy and their behaviour in order
to “fit” into reimbursement’. She added that ‘historically, the efforts to introduce DRG as
the main healthcare reimbursement mechanism in the Czech Republic faced fundamental
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obstacles. One of which is the heterogeneity of DRG cases that were taken over from other
countries. That was also the reason—and not the only one—to start the cultivation process,
within the so called DRG Restart project. I perceive this as a very good decision’.
Jan Kvaček, director of Bulovka Hospital, agreed with this when he described the
DRG Restart project as a project showing who is efficient and who is not. He claims that
‘his hospital is, in most cases, deeply under the reference average—so, cost efficient and
at the same time, his hospital is in the red. How is it possible? Normally in the market,
one who has the lowest costs is someone who beats others. Why is it not like this in the
healthcare sector? It is because hospitals are receiving historically set payments—for the
same CMI, they are receiving different money. And the differences are huge: someone
receives 20 while others receive 65 . . . ’ [32].
The same problem was mentioned by Michal Čarvaš, the South-bohemian hospital
Executive board member who claimed that ‘today we can see significant differences in
revenues for patients in the same hospital chamber—depending on the insurer, the revenues
differ about 30–40%. And I am not even mentioning that these differences depend on the
type of health establishment: department, region or university hospital. The basic care in
the university hospitals is overestimated and helps to finance the undervalued specialised
care which is expensive and badly set in the reimbursement mechanism. The whole system
is fundamentally deformed’.
6. Discussion
The data obtained by our analysis documents several critical problems of the current
DRG system in the Czech Republic. The results of our analysis indicate that revenues are
greatly influenced by the individual base rate (rate negotiated with insurer). In correlation
with the interviews, the data obtained in our analysis confirm that the largest differences
between costs and revenues might be observed in the case of the largest of our co-operating
hospital (overestimated care due to the historically set reimbursement mechanisms). The
results of our study show that although base rate convergence for providers is expected to
be the next logical step, it might be very unfavourable for some healthcare providers given
the current reimbursement setting. Defining a minimum base rate should not significantly
impact any of the studied hospitals, therefore an overvaluation of the convergence corridor
is unlikely. Efforts to avoid a deepening of the difference in individual base rates are
translated in the current reimbursement decree. Our calculations indicate that a sudden
convergence of base rates, e.g., through an average base rate for all hospitals, would result
in a more sizeable compensation for costs in Hospital C and for orthopaedic patient cost
in Hospital B. The latter provider would also see an increase in revenues from patients
in surgery bases. The cost of patients in surgery bases in Hospital A, on the other hand,
would be covered insufficiently.
The revenue analysis leads us also to the conclusion that providers whose average
revenues grow in correlation with the growth of the average CMI have a more favourable
reimbursement setting. A comparison of revenues from specific bases does not yield such
clear-cut correlations. The differences are due to different rates negotiated by providers
with different payers. Another factor is the volume of reported care compared with the
reference period. This is a problem for efforts to erase reimbursement differences because
current payments are tied to payments in previous years. Providers have little influence
over the second factor, which takes some degree of responsibility from payers.
In terms of costs, our data show that the real cost does not correspond to the current
diagnosis classification and, as shown from the interviews, cost is not predictable with
sufficient accuracy.
Moreover, the information received from the interviews illustrates that the current
DRG system is not motivating. Respondents were asked to comment on the consequences
of various types of payment calculation used between 2012 and 2018 and their experience
with and impression of reimbursement changes in this period. An interesting finding is
that despite rather turbulent changes in the reimbursement policy taking place in 2012
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(from 100% lump-sum payment to almost 100% DRG), hospital representatives did not
describe 2012 as a major turning point in this area. The same is true for all the other years
of the studied period. The hospitals even indicated that the changes to reimbursement
decrees had little impact on their establishments. However, what the respondents were
highly critical of was the instability of the system and artificial increases in wage tariffs by
the Ministry of Health without reflecting these wage hikes in reimbursements. Personnel
costs make up a considerable portion (around 50%) of the total cost incurred by regional
hospitals [33].
This shows that the Czech reimbursement mechanism ‘lives a life of its own’ with
little ties to reality.
Obviously, the delivered analysis has some limitations. First, the sample of hospitals
is small, the authors analysed the situation in three out of 76 regional hospitals which
provide a comprehensive type of healthcare services in the Czech Republic. This small
size of the sample represents the biggest weakness of the analysis; therefore, the results
of the analysis were consulted and confirmed with experts. Second, the variability of the
selected hospitals is relatively low. It would be more than interesting to enlarge the sample,
ideally with university hospitals where one can expect that the differences between cost
and revenues will be expressive. There are some limitations stemming from the selected
ABC method that is very demanding in data collection. As mentioned in the text, some
data are imperfect. However, these limitations should not have any impact on the global
picture received.
7. Conclusions
Our study (despite the small sample used) suggests that the current implementation of
the DRG system in Czech reimbursements is set in a way that is very similar to traditional
flat rates and is unlikely to yield major positive effects to the DRG mechanism, such
as predictability of payments for hospitalisation cases, care quality and efficiency, and
transparent financing. The results of our study and the opinions of experts indicate
that despite frequent changes to reimbursement decrees and an effort to include DRG in
intensive hospital care reimbursement, there is still a great need to further cultivate the
system in the Czech Republic.
Based on our results and in compliance with the conducted interviews, we are con-
vinced that a deep systemic change of the reimbursement mechanism in the Czech Republic
is necessary. The main expected output of the DRG Restart project is to primarily include
classification changes. Even if the improved classifications are indispensable, it cannot be
seen as a real systemic change of the reimbursement system.
To reflect the general problems defined above, we propose five partial measures that
are, in our eyes and in the eyes of experts, indispensable prerequisites facilitating the
systemic change of the reimbursement mechanism in the Czech Republic that will lead to
the cultivation of the Czech DRG:
1. the correct diagnosis classification setting and cost predictability,
2. availability of standardised, high-quality cost information and accessible hospi-
tal benchmarking,
3. the gradual base rate convergence,
4. less government dictation on the wage tariffs,
5. large number of costs-collecting hospitals.
As for the first measure, a higher quality of classification seems necessary for system
improvement to benefit all participants. The case mix index should reflect the real costs.
This means that the real cost must correspond to the current diagnosis classification and
cost must be predictable with sufficient accuracy. The DRG Restart project is proposing to
increase the exactness of classification through secondary diagnoses and their scores, even
with a smaller impact on reimbursements. In the light of the results yielded by our study,
this seems to be a reasonable solution. The new classification should give greater weight
to the combination of the main diagnosis and reported procedures. However, it should
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not overlook the importance of secondary diagnoses either [33]. Another key condition is
correct reporting of secondary diagnoses. We can look at the example of two of our analysed
healthcare providers: while Hospital B has on average 2.6 secondary diagnoses reported
per case in this base, Hospital C has only 0.62 secondary diagnoses per case on average.
Even if the size of the studied sample is small, this difference is considerable as both
hospitals belong to the same DRG category (regional hospitals providing comprehensive
care). Although when comparing hospitals we must take into account representation of
different severity groups without each base, the difference in reported care is very clear in
this case and might be one of the reasons for the negative balance of calculated cost and
revenues generated by this healthcare provider.
The next step in efforts to make the current classification more accurate should make
sure that a patient’s age is reflected in the relative weight of care. In our calculations, we
encountered a problem with personnel cost attribution to treatment days. This is a general
trend which is valid regardless of the size of sample. One of the reasons for selecting an
indirect attribution of personnel cost is the fact that hospital staff have declared widely
different levels of patient care difficulty depending on the patient’s age, complications and
co-morbidities. As personnel costs make up a considerable portion of the total cost incurred
by healthcare providers, this seems to be a major failure of the current DRG system. The
DRG Restart project classification promises to take patient age into account in determining
the relative weight of a case. Patient age should compensate for potential disadvantages
suffered by those providers who happen to treat more elderly patients than the average.
Finance distribution by payers should then correlate more with the demographics of a
population. These changes, which are crucial, will allow hospitals to make medium-term
strategies and will lead to more open transparency of the reimbursement. This could
therefore make the DRG more motivating.
As for the second measure (analytical evidence), it is crucial to unify the analytical
evidence in all hospitals (not only in the reference hospitals). We believe that data for
the hospital benchmarking should be accessible. The aim is to monitor the tendencies of
hospitals to increase their efficiency (cost reduction and quality increase). It is necessary
to emphasise the correct care and cost reporting. For the correct care reporting, this is
reflected in the DRG Restart project which takes the standard medical care reporting as its
basis. As a result, data can be collected not only from healthcare providers but also from
insurers [34].
Conversely, the cost reporting is not treated by the DRG Restart. However, based
on [21], the fairness of DRG-based hospital payment systems and the ability of these
systems to encourage efficiency are to a large extent determined by the quality of the
hospital cost information used to develop these systems and to calculate DRG weights.
Unfortunately, suggested changes to the Czech DRG are mostly based on a more detailed
specification and classification of hospitalisation cases (such as DRG categories introduc-
tion, changes in secondary diagnosis coding and five levels of severity). Changes to the
reimbursement mechanism are not planned.
The third measure (base rate convergence) is related to the fact that, as shown in our
analysis, there exist important differences in a hospital’s revenues per unit of production
among providers and where the payments for the same case vary with different insurers—
this general trend was confirmed in our analysis too. A gradual convergence of base rates
could be a good starting point for a reduction of the effect of past reimbursements and
deals with insurers. The DRG Restart project aims at creating the base rates map and
to simulate the consequences of its changes. An accurate rate convergence should not
increase the insurers’ risk of unreasonable hikes in reimbursements while increasing system
transparency and possibly improving assessment of care efficiency. However, all these
options require a sufficient and accurate classification because even this study confirms
that the level of CMI, or of relative weights, is not in a way that would correlate at the
given level with the cost of the relevant DRG base and the diagnoses included therein.
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The fourth measure is connected to the problem of artificial increases in wage tariffs by
the Ministry of Health without reflecting these wage hikes in reimbursements. Personnel
costs make up a considerable portion (around 50%) of the total cost incurred by regional
hospitals [33], and this seems to be a major failure of the current DRG. The annual index of
the growth in personnel costs is higher than the growth in the revenues from the insurers.
As it is a purely political decision, this might not be solved by the DRG Restart project.
The fifth measure (a large number of costs-collecting hospitals) is connected with our
belief that the DRG quality is connected with the quality of initial data. Therefore, the aim
of the DRG policy should be in increasing the number of hospitals that are voluntarily
providing standardised data.
The final finding is the conclusion that the current DRG Restart project seems to aim
at correcting the current problems of the Czech DRG, however the quality of proposed
changes is limited and the impact of these changes on the behaviour of care providers is
debatable, especially due to the effect of existing regulatory restrictions (for more about
problematic regulatory environment see, e.g., [35]. Transparent and effective reimburse-
ment is not just a matter of a scientifically advanced approach. To ensure that hospital care
reimbursement really promotes improvements in care quality and efficiency of financing,
truly systemic changes are also necessary.
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Appendix A
Table A1. People activity matrix for the base 0818 (total knee replacement), Hospital C. The length of
activities in minutes.
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
Physician orth. 20 108 10 20
Physician orth. 108
Nurse orth. 20 108 20
Physician anaesth. 20 138
Nurse anaesth. 20 138
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Table A2. Cost matrix, base 0818, Hospital B (CZK).
Type of Cost A1 A2 A3.1 A3.2 A4 A5
Material 1.331 0.571 286.132 234.981 831.619 5.435
Energy, water, gas 1.324 1.324 23.588 0.000 12.927 1.324
Reparations and maintenance 0.811 0.811 61.348 0.000 7.920 0.811
Travel costs 0.196 0.196 2.257 0.000 1.915 0.196
Services 5.688 5.688 102.236 0.000 55.551 5.688
Personnel costs 42.811 33.475 0.000 623.206 3017.898 33.475
Depreciation 0.179 0.179 121.209 0.000 24.282 0.179
Other costs 0.291 0.291 10.113 0.000 2.845 0.291
Aggregate activities 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.623 0.000
Sterilisation 0.000 0.000 313.116 0.000 4.729 0.000
Other internal costs 9.690 8.940 183.279 0.000 924.596 13.739
Source: Authors.
Table A3. Costs of average patient for the base 0818.
Orthopaedic Wards: Base 0818
Activities
Cost [CZK]
Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C
Admission + anaesthesiology 845 933 1053
Surgery 8,701 16,078 10,481
Hospitalisation 27,282 38,941 57,530
Release 445 501 530
Separately billed material 48,324 70,088 73,156
Total 85,597 126,541 142,750
Source: Authors.
Table A4. Cost matrix, base 0605, Hospital A (thousands of CZK).
Type of Cost A1 A2 A3.1 A3.2 A4 A5
Material 0.949 0.407 38.60 131.40 184.43 5.25
Energy, water, gas 2.265 2.265 4.978 0.000 12.824 2.265
Reparations and maintenance 1.099 1.099 8.537 0.000 6.224 1.099
Travel costs 0.288 0.288 0.177 0.000 1.633 0.288
Services 6.929 6.929 9.845 0.000 39.240 6.929
Personnel costs 26.856 26.856 0.000 210.849 1645.831 26.856
Depreciation 0.155 0.155 38.711 0.000 12.166 0.155
Other costs 5.050 5.050 10.779 0.000 28.597 5.050
Aggregate activities 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37.133 0.000
Sterilisation 0.000 0.000 54.899 0.000 2.827 0.000
Other internal costs 12.748 12.334 42.163 0.000 217.176 16.024
Source: Authors.
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Table A5. Cost matrix, base 0606, Hospital A (thousands of CZK).
Type of Cost A1 A2 A3.1 A3.2 A4 A5
Material 0.763 0.327 52.775 478.748 136.266 4.223
Energy, water, gas 1.821 1.821 6.807 0.000 9.475 1.821
Reparations and maintenance 0.884 0.884 11.674 0.000 4.598 0.884
Travel costs 0.232 0.232 0.241 0.000 1.206 0.232
Services 5.574 5.574 13.461 0.000 28.992 5.574
Personnel costs 21.602 21.602 0.000 337.658 1340.950 21.602
Depreciation 0.125 0.125 52.934 0.000 8.989 0.125
Other costs 4.062 4.062 14.739 0.000 21.129 4.062
Aggregate activities 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.977 0.000
Sterilisation 0.000 0.000 75.068 0.000 2.089 0.000
Other internal costs 10.253 9.921 57.654 0.000 160.461 12.889
Source: Authors.
Table A6. Cost matrix, base 0608, Hospital A (thousands of CZK).
Type of Cost A1 A2 A3.1 A3.2 A4 A5
Material 2.394 1.026 98.718 160.313 382.956 13.241
Energy, water, gas 5.711 5.711 12.733 0.000 26.628 5.711
Reparations and maintenance 2.772 2.772 21.836 0.000 12.923 2.772
Travel costs 0.727 0.727 0.452 0.000 3.390 0.727
Services 17.474 17.474 25.180 0.000 81.479 17.474
Personnel costs 67.724 67.724 0.000 542.459 2526.719 67.724
Depreciation 0.391 0.391 99.014 0.000 25.261 0.391
Other costs 12.735 12.735 27.569 0.000 59.381 12.735
Aggregate activities 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.601 0.000
Sterilisation 0.000 0.000 140.419 0.000 5.870 0.000
Other internal costs 32.146 31.104 107.844 0.000 450.951 40.409
Source: Authors.
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34. Pavlík, T. Klasifikační faktory systému CZ-DRG verze 1.0. In Konference DRG Restart 2017; ÚZIS: Praha, Czech Republic, 2017;
pp. 17–18.
35. Bjoerkman, J.; Nemec, J. Health Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. In The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy;
NISPAcee Press: Bratislava, Slovakia, 2013; Volume 6, pp. 131–152.
